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THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND THE 
IDEOLOGY OF SELF-PROTECTION 
Don B. Kates. Jr.* 
From the enactment of the Bill of Rights through most of the 
twentieth century, the second amendment seems to have been un-
derstood to guarantee to every law-abiding responsible adult the 
right to possess most ordinary firearms. Until the mid-twentieth 
century courts and commentaries (the two earliest having been 
before Congress when it voted on the second amendment) deemed 
that the amendment "confirmed [the people] in their right to keep 
and bear their private arms," or "their own arms." 1 In a 1939 case 
which is its only full treatment, the Supreme Court accepted that 
private persons may invoke the second amendment, but held that it 
confines their freedom of choice to militia-type weapons, i.e., high 
quality handguns and rifles, but not "gangster weapons" such as 
sawed-off shotguns, switchblade knives and (arguably) "Saturday 
Night Specials. "2 
In the 1960s this individual right view was challenged by schol-
ars who argued that the second amendment guarantee extends only 
to the states' right to arm formal military units.3 This states' right 
view attained predominance, and was endorsed by the ABA, the 
ACLU and such texts as Lawrence Tribe's American Constitutional 
Law. During the 1980s, however, a large literature on the amend-
• Attorney, Novato, California. 
I. In addition to the cases and earlier commentaries quoted and discussed in Don B. 
Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. 
L. Rev. 204, 224, 241-51 (1983), see John N. Pomeroy, An Introduction to the Constitutional 
Law of the United States 152-3 (Hurd and Houghton, 1868); Hermann E. von Holst, 5 The 
Constitutional and Political History of the United States 307 (John J. Lalor, trans., Callaghan 
& Co., 1885); Henry C. Black, Handbook of American Constitutional Law 543 (West, 3d ed. 
1910); James Schouler, Constitutional Studies: State and Federal (Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1897); 
John Randolph Tucker, 2 The Constitution of the United States 671 (Henry Tucker, ed., 
Callaghan & Co., 1899); Albert H. Putney, United States Constitutional History and Law 363 
(Illinois Book Exch., 1908); Comment, Is the Pistol Responsible for Crime?, I J. of Crim. L., 
Crimin. & Pol. Sci. 793, 794 (1911). 
2. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
3. See, e.g., John Levin, The Right to Bear Arms: The Development of the American 
Experience, 48 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 148 (1971); Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and 
Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2 Hast. Const. L.Q. 961 
(1975). 
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ment appeared, much of it rejecting the states' right view as incon-
sistent with the text and with new research findings on the 
legislative history, the attitudes of the authors, the meaning of the 
right to bear arms in antecedent American and English legal 
thought, and the role that an armed citizenry played in classical 
liberal political philosophy from Aristotle through Machiavelli and 
Harrington to Sidney, Locke, Rousseau and their various disciples.4 
Indicative of the current Supreme Court's probable view is a 1990 
decision which, though focussing on the fourth amendment, cites 
the first and second as well in concluding that the phrase "right of 
the people" is a term of art used throughout the Bill of Rights to 
designate rights pertaining to individual citizens (rather than to the 
states).s 
Sanford Levinson speculates that the indifference of academics, 
and the legal profession generally, to the second amendment reflects 
a mixture of sheer opposition to the idea of private ownership of 
guns and the perhaps subconscious fear that altogether plausible, 
perhaps even "winning," interpretations of the Second Amend-
ment would present real hurdles to those of us supporting pro-
hibitory regulation. 6 
But Levinson and others who reluctantly embrace the individual 
right view are not always sympathetic to gun ownership, and cer-
tainly not to the gun lobby's obnoxious pretension that the amend-
ment bars any gun control it happens to oppose, however moderate 
or rational. 1 This may help account for the fact that, though the 
availability of guns for self-defense is of great import to the gun 
lobby, that issue plays little part in modern academic exposition of 
the individual right position. In contrast, proponents of the state's 
4. See, e.g. Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 
J. Am. Hist. 599 (1982); Kates, 82 Mich. L. Rev. at 230-35 (cited in note 1); Joyce Lee 
Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law Tradition, 10 
Hast. Const. L.Q. 285 (1983); Stephen P. Halbrook, "That Every Man Be Armed':· The 
Erolution of a Constititutional Right (U. N.M. Press, 1984); Sanford Levinson, The Embar-
rassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637 (1989); Don B. Kates, Minimalist Interpretation 
of the Second Amendment ("Minimalist Interpretation") in Eugene W. Hickok, ed., The Bill 
of Rights: Original Understanding and Current Meaning at 130 (U. Pr. of Va., l99l)("Bill of 
Rights"); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1162-73 
(1991); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Towards an 
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 Georgetown L.J. 309 (1991). 
5. United States v. VerdugcrUrquidez, 110 S.Ct. 1056 (1990). 
6. Levinson, 99 Yale L.J. at 642 (cited in note 4). 
7. For a debate between the NRA 's primary exponent of the amendment and myself as 
to the extent to which various moderate, sensible gun controls are allowable under the indi-
vidual right view we both endorse, see Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A 
Linguistic Analysis of the Right to "Bear Arms", 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 151 (Winter 
1986), and Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 
143 (Winter 1986). 
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right view do focus on the issue of self-protection, straight-for-
wardly denying the existence of historical evidence that self-protec-
tion was one of the concerns underlying the second amendment. 8 
The purpose of this article is to explore the numerous and pro-
tean ways in which the concept of self-protection related to the 
amendment in the minds of its authors. Indeed, self-defense is at 
the core of the second amendment and was an element in the Foun-
ders' political thought generally. At the same time, it is important 
to recognize that the Founders' view of self-protection was not only 
stronger but also more inclusive than the concept described by 
many modern thinkers. To the Founders and their intellectual 
progenitors, being prepared for self-defense was a moral imperative 
as well as a pragmatic necessity; moreover, its pragmatic value lay 
less in repelling usurpation than in deterring it before it occurred. 
The underpinnings of the classical liberal belief in an armed 
people are obscure to us because we are not accustomed to thinking 
about political issues in criminological terms. But the classical lib-
eral world view was criminological, for lack of a better word. It held 
that good citizens must always be prepared to defend themselves 
and their society against criminal usurpation-a characterization 
no less applicable to tyrannical ministers or pillaging foreign or do-
mestic soldiery (who were, in point of fact, largely composed of 
criminals inducted from gaols)9 than to apolitical outlaws. 
To natural law philosophers, self-defense was "the primary law 
of nature," the primary reason for man entering society.w Indeed, 
it was viewed as not just a right but a positive duty: God gives Man 
both life and the means to defend it so that the refusal to do so 
reviles God's gift. A refusal to engage in self-defense is a Judea-
Christian form of hubris. Indicative of the intellectual gulf between 
that era and our own is that when Montesquieu asked, "Who does 
not see that self-defence is a duty superior to every precept?" 11 he 
was posing the question rhetorically rather than meaningfully. 
8. See, e.g., George D. Newton & Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Violence in 
American Life 259 (Nat. Com'n on Causes & Prevention of Violence, 1970) (characterizing 
the second amendment "as a scheme dealing with military service, not individual defense."). 
9. Russell F. Weighley, History of the United States Army 19 (Macmillan Co., 1967). 
See note 45 for discussion of the billeting of criminous troops on the king's enemies as a 
punishment and means of surveillance. Throughout the eighteenth century, criminal offenses 
by English soldiers and sailors in the colonies were a constant occurrence, and a subject of 
constant antagonism between Americans and the English military which refused either to 
punish their men or to turn them over to local justice. See generally Pauline Maier, From 
Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to 
Britain. 1765-1776 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1972) ("From Resistance to Revolution"). 
10. William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries *4; see generally Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 
ch. XIII (1651, rep. George Routledge & Sons, 1894). 
11. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, in Mortimer Adler, ed. 35 Great Books of the 
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Radiating out directly from this core belief in self-defense as 
the most self-evident of rights came the multiple chains of reasoning 
by which contemporary thinkers sought to resolve a multitude of 
diverse questions. For instance, seventeenth and eighteenth century 
treatises on international law were addicted to long disquisitions on 
individual self-protection from which they attempted to deduce a 
law of nations.12 More important for present purposes, John Locke 
adduced from the right of individual self-protection his justification 
of the right(s) of individuals to resist tyranical officials and, if neces-
sary, to band together with other good citizens in overthrowing tyr-
anny. Slavers, robbers and other outlaws who would deprive honest 
citizens of their rights may be resisted even to the death because 
their attempted usurpation places them in a "state of war" against 
honest men. Likewise, when a King and/or his officials attempt to 
divest a subject of life, liberty or property they dissolve the compact 
by which he has agreed to their governance and enter into a state of 
war with him-wherefore they may be resisted the same as any 
other usurper.B Similarly, Algernon Sidney declared: "Swords 
were given to men, that none might be Slaves, but such as know not 
how to use them."I4 "Nay, all Laws must fall, human Societies that 
subsist by them be dissolved, and all innocent persons be exposed to 
the violence of the most wicked, if men might not justly defend 
themselves against injustice .... "Is 
From these premises it followed, as Thomas Paine wrote, that 
"the good man" had both right and need for arms; moreover, no 
law would dissuade "the invader and the plunderer" from having 
them. So, "since some will not, others dare not lay them aside." 
"Horrid mischief would ensue were [the law-abiding] deprived of 
the use of them; ... the weak will become a prey to the strong."I6 
Cesare Beccaria assailed arms bans as a paradigm of simplistic legis-
lation reflecting "False Ideas of Utility." His discussion deserves 
quotation in full, in part because Thomas Jefferson laboriously cop-
ied it in long-hand into his personal compilation of great quotations: 
Western World 217 (Thomas Nugent, tr., Encyclopedia Britannica, 2d ed. 1990) ("Spin't of 
the Laws"). 
12. See, e.g. J.J. Burlamqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law 112-13, 119, 121 
(Nugent, tr., Cambridge U. Press, 5th ed. 1807); de Vattel, The Law of Nations: Principles of 
the Law of Nature 22 (Joseph Chitty, tr., T. & J.W. Johnson, 1854). 
13. John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original. Extent and End of Civil Gov-
ernment (Second Treatise of Government) (1694), in Thomas I. Cook, ed., Two Treatises of 
Government 119, 129-30 (Haffner Pub., 1947). 
14. Algernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government 270 (1698). 
15. ld. at 266-67. 
16. Moncure Conway, ed., 1 Writings of Thomas Paine 56 (Putnam, 1894) (emphasis in 
original) ("Writings"). 
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False is the idea of utility that sacrifices a thousand real advan-
tages for one imaginary or trifling inconvenience; that would take 
fire from men because it burns, and water because one may 
drown in it; that has no remedy for evils, except destruction. 
The laws that forbid the carrying of arms are laws of such a na-
ture. They disarm those only who are neither inclined nor deter-
mined to commit crimes. Can it be supposed that those who 
have the courage to violate the most sacred laws of humanity, the 
most important of the code, will respect the less important and 
arbitrary ones, which can be violated with ease and impunity, 
and which, if strictly obeyed, would put an end to personal lib-
erty-so dear to men, so dear to the enlightened legislator-and 
subject innocent persons to all the vexations that the guilty alone 
ought to suffer? Such laws make things worse for the assaulted 
and better for the assailants; they serve rather to encourage than 
to prevent homicides, for an unarmed man may be attacked with 
greater confidence than an armed man. They ought to be desig-
nated as laws not preventive but fearful of crimes, produced by 
the tumultuous impression of a few isolated facts, and not by 
thoughtful consideration of the inconveniences and advantages of 
a universal decree.l7 
91 
Likewise, Montesquieu condemned laws against firearms as in-
fringing the natural law of self defense. Is As inheritors of these 
ideas, the Founders believed that the right to arms was a necessary 
ingredient of the moral duty of self-defense. The ideas underlying 
the second amendment are further obscured to us by the distinction 
we tend to draw between self-protection as a purely private and per-
sonal value, and defense of the community which we tend to con-
ceptualize as a function and value of the police. Modern Americans 
tend to see incidents in which a violent criminal is thwarted by a 
police officer as very different from similar incidents in which the 
defender is a civilian. When the police defend citizens it is seen 
(and lauded) as defense of the community. In contrast, when civil-
ians defend themselves and their families the tendency is to regard 
them as exercising what is, at best, a purely personal privilege serv-
ing only the particular interests of those defended, not those of the 
community at large. Such influential and progressive voices in 
American life as Garry Wills, Ramsey Clark and the Washington 
Post go further yet, labelling those who own firearms for family de-
fense as "anti-citizens," and "traitors, enemies of their own patria" 
17. Ceasare Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments 87-8 (Henry Paolucci, tr., 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1963). 
18. Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws at 224-25 (cited in note II). 
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who arm "against their own neighbors,"t9 and denouncing "the 
need that some homeowners and shopkeepers believe they have for 
weapons to defend themselves" as representing "the worst instincts 
in the human character," a return to barbarism and to "anarchy, 
not order under law-a jungle where each relies on himself for 
survival. "2o 
The notion that the truly civilized person eschews self-defense, 
relying on the police instead, or that private self-protection dis-
serves the public interest, would never have occurred to the Foun-
ders since there were no police in eighteenth century America and 
England.2I In the tradition from which the second amendment de-
rives it was not only the unquestioned right, but a crucial element in 
the moral character of every free man that he be armed and willing 
to defend his family and the community against crime. This duty 
included both individual acts and joining with his fellows in hunting 
criminals down when the hue and cry went up, as well as the more 
formal posse and militia patrol duties, under the control of justices 
of the peace or sheriffs.22 In this milieu, individuals who thwarted a 
crime against themselves or their families were seen as serving the 
community as wel1.23 
This failure to distinguish between the value of self-protection 
to individuals and to the community helps account for what mod-
em readers may deem a remarkable myopia in seventeenth to nine-
teenth century discourse on crime, self-protection, and community 
interest. Without apparent consciousness of any difference, that 
discourse addressed issues of community defense as if it were only 
individual self-protection writ large. Thus, Montesquieu confi-
dently asserted that "[t]he life of governments is like that of man. 
The latter has a right to kill in case of natural defence: the former 
have a right to wage war for their own preservation. "24 Likewise, 
Thomas Paine cited the indubitable right and need for "the good 
man" to be armed against "the vile and abandoned" as irrefutable 
evidence of the right and need of nations to arm for defense against 
19. Quoted in Don B. Kates, The Value of Civilian Handgun Possession as a Deterrent 
to Crime or a Defense Against Crime, 18 Am. J. Crim. L. 113, 119 (1991). 
20. Guns and the Civilizing Process, Washington Post A16, col. 1 (Sept. 26, 1972); Ram-
say Clark, Cn'me in America 107 (Simon & Schuster, 1970). 
21. See Kates, 82 Mich. L. Rev. at 214-16 (cited in note 1); Frank Mom, Firearms Use 
and Police: A Historic Evolution in American Values ("Firearms Use"), in Don B. Kates, ed., 
Firearms and Violence 489 (Ballinger, 1984). 
22. Kates, 82 Mich. L. Rev. at 214-16 (cited in note 1); Malcolm, 10 Hast. Const. L.Q. 
at 290-92 (cited in note 4). 
23. See generally Kates, 82 Mich. L. Rev. at 214-16 (cited in note 1); Mom, Firearms 
Use, in Kates, ed., Firearms and Violence at 489 (cited in note 21). 
24. Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws at 61 (cited in note 11). 
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"the invader and plunderer"; for, if deprived of arms, "the weak 
will become a prey to the strong."2s As we have seen, Algernon 
Sydney and John Locke adduced from the right of individual self-
defense their justification of the right(s) of individuals to resist 
tyranical officials and, if necessary, to band together with other 
good citizens to overthrow tyranny. 
Thus a crucial point for understanding the second amendment 
is that it emerged from a tradition which viewed general possession 
of arms as a positive social good, as well as an indispensable adjunct 
to the individual right of self-defense. Moreover, arms were deemed 
to protect against every species of criminal usurpation, including 
"political crime," a phrase which the Founders would have under-
stood in its most literal sense. Whether murder, rape, and theft be 
committed by gangs of assassins, tyrannous officials and judges or 
pillaging soldiery was a mere detail; the criminality of the "invader 
and plunderer" lay in his violation of natural law and rights, re-
gardless of the guise in which he violated them. The right to resist 
and to possess arms therefore remained the same, as did the com-
munity benefit. 
These notions of community benefit from individuals armed 
and ready to exercise their natural right of self-defense come to-
gether in the thought of Sir William Blackstone. Significantly, the 
way in which he described the right to arms emphasizes both the 
individual self-protection rationale and the criminological premises, 
which are so foreign to the terms of the modern debate over the 
second amendment. 
Blackstone placed the right to arms among the "absolute rights 
of individuals at common law," those rights he saw as preserving to 
England its free government and to Englishmen their liberties. Yet, 
unquestionably, what Blackstone was referring to was individuals' 
rights to have and use personal arms for self-protection. He de-
scribes the right to bear arms as being "for self-preservation and 
defense," and self-defense as being "the primary law of nature 
[which cannot be] taken away by the law of society"2L-the "natu-
ral right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of 
society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of 
oppression. "27 
But Blackstone's analysis also demonstrates a final distinction 
between our world view and that of the Founders. For Blackstone 
saw the right to personal arms for personal self-defense as a political 
25. Conway, ed., I Writings at 56 (cited in note 16). 
26. William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries •4. 
27. William Blackstone, I Commentaries •144. 
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right of fundamental importance. His discussion of the "absolute 
rights of individuals" ends with the following: 
In these several rights consist the rights, or, as they are fre-
quently termed, the liberties of Englishmen. . . . So long as these 
remain inviolate, the subject is perfectly free; for every species of 
compulsive tyranny and oppression must act in opposition to one 
or [an]other of these rights, having no other object upon which it 
can possible be employed. . . . And, lastly, to vindicate these 
rights, when actually violated or attacked, the subjects of Eng-
land are entitled, in the first place, to the regular and free course 
of justice in the courts of law; next, to the right of petitioning the 
King and parliament for redress of grievances; and, lastly, to the 
right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defense.28 
To readers with modern sensibilities this inevitably raises two 
questions to which the remainder of this article is devoted: Why did 
Blackstone regard the right to possess arms for self-protection as a 
political matter? How could he have grouped (what we at least con-
ceive as no more than) a privilege to have the means of repelling a 
robber, rapist or cutthroat with such political rights as access to the 
courts and to petition for redress of grievances? 
To answer these questions is to come to a fuller understanding 
of the moral and symbolic significance of the right to bear arms in 
the classical world view. Arms possession for protection of self, 
family and polity was both the hallmark of the individual's freedom 
and one of the two primary factors in his developing the independ-
ent, self-reliant, responsible character which classical political phi-
losophers deemed necessary to the citizenry of a free state. The 
symbolic significance of arms as epitomizing the status of the free 
citizen represented ancient law. From Anglo-Saxon times "the cer-
emony of freeing a slave included the placing in his hands of" arms 
"as a symbol of his new rank."29 Anglo-Saxon law forbade anyone 
to disarm a free man and Henry I's laws applied this even to the 
man's own lord.Jo Such precedents were particularly important to 
theorists like Blackstone and Jefferson, to whom the concept of 
"natural rights" had a strongly juridical tinge relating to the Eng-
lish legal heritage. 
The Anglo-American legal distinction between free/armed and 
unfree/disarmed flowed naturally into the classical republican view 
that the survival of free and popular government required citizens 
28. ld. (emphasis added). 
29. A.V.B. Norman, The Medieval Soldier 73 (Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1971) 
30. The Assize of Arms (1181), reprinted in David C. Douglas & George W. Greenaway, 
eds., 2 English Historical Documents at 416 (Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1953). 
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of a special character-and that the possession of arms was one of 
two keys in the development of that character. From Machiavelli 
and Harrington classical republican philosophy derived the idea 
that arms possession and property ownership were the keys to civic 
virtue. In the Greek and Roman republics from whose example 
they took so many lessons, every free man had been armed so as to 
be prepared both to defend his family against outlaws and to man 
the city walls in immediate response to the tocsin warning of ap-
proaching enemies. Thus did each citizen commit himself to the 
fulfillment of both his private and his public responsibilities.Jt 
The very survival of republican institutions depended upon this 
moral (as well as physical) commitment-upon the moral and phys-
ical strength of the armed freeholder: sturdy, independent, scrupu-
lous, and upright, the self-reliant defender of his life, liberty, family, 
and polity from outlaws, oppressive officials, despotic government, 
and foreign invasion alike. That the freeholder might never have to 
use his arms in such protection mattered naught. Indeed, one basic 
tenet classical political theory took from its criminological premises 
was that of deterrence: if armed and ready the free man would be 
least likely ever to actually have to defend. 
Commitment, duty, and responsibility are also viewed as posi-
tive rights because to the virtuous citizen the carrying out of respon-
sibilities to family and duties to country are a right. The right of 
arms is one of the first to be taken away by tyrants, not only for the 
physical security despotism gains in monopolizing armed power in 
the hands of the state, but also for its moral effects. The tyrant 
disarms his citizens in order to degrade them; he knows that being 
unarmed 
palsies the hand and brutalizes the mind: an habitual disuse of 
physical forces totally destroys the moral; and men lose at once 
the power of protecting themselves, and of discerning the cause 
of their oppression. 32 
Thus, when Machiavelli said that "to be disarmed is to be con-
temptible," he meant not simply to be held in contempt, but to de-
serve it; by disarming men tyrants render them at once brutish and 
pusillanimous. 
It was in this tradition of civic virtue through armament that 
Thomas Jefferson (who believed that every boy of ten should be 
given a gun as he had been) advised his fifteen year old nephew: 
31. Kates, 82 Mich. L. Rev. at 230-2 (cited in note 1). 
32. Joel Barlow, Advice to the Privileged Orders in the Several States of Europe: Result-
ing From the Necessity and Propriety of a General Revolution in the Principle of Government, 
Part I 45 (1792, reprinted by Cornell U. Pr., 1956) ("Advice to the Privileged"). 
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A strong body makes the mind strong. As to the species of exer-
cises, I advise the gun. While this gives a moderate exercise to 
the body, it gives boldness, enterprize and independance to the 
mind. Games played with the ball and others of that nature, are 
too violent for the body and stamp no character on the mind. 
Let your gun therefore be the constant companion of your 
walks.33 
Of course the basis for the Founders' belief in the possession of 
arms was not limited to purely moral premises. Indeed, the Foun-
ders and their intellectual progenitors had an almost boundless faith 
in the pragmatic, as well as the moral, impact of widespread arms 
possession. They believed in the efficacy of civilian arms possession 
as deterrent and defense against outlaws, tyrants, and foreign invad-
ers alike. Madison confidently assured his fellow-countrymen that 
a free people need not fear government because of "the advantage of 
being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of al-
most every other nation. "34 Arming the people is, according to 
Locke's followers Trenchard and Moyle, 
the surest way to preserve [their liberties] both at home and 
abroad, the People being secured thereby as well against the 
Domestick Affronts of any of their own [fellow] Citizens, as 
against the Foreign Invasions of ambitious and unruly 
Neighbours. 3s 
This faith in the possession of arms buoyed up Locke and his 
English and American followers against their opponents' charge 
that their advocacy of a right to resistance and even revolution 
would lead to sanguinary and internecine disorders. To the con-
trary, they replied, that is what will come from disarming the peo-
ple. Unchecked by the salubrious fear of its armed populace, 
government will follow its natural tendency to despotism. Tyran-
nous ministers will push their usurpations to the point that even an 
unarmed people will rise en masse to take their rights back into 
their bloody hands regardless of casualties.36 But where the people 
are armed it would rarely, if ever, come to this for, as Thomas Paine 
asserted, "arms like laws discourage and keep the invader and plun-
33. Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr, August 19, 1785, in Julian P. Boyd, ed., 8 The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 405, 407 (Princeton U. Press, 1953). 
34. Federalist 46 (Madison), in The Federalist Papers at 294, 299 (Arlington House, 
1966). 
35. John Trenchard & Walter Moyle, An Argument Shewing, That a Standing Army is 
Inconsistent With a Free Government, and Absolutely Destructive to the Constitution of the 
English Monarchy 1 (1697) ("An Argument"). 
36. Kates, Minimalist Interpretation, in Hickok, Bill of Rights at 132 (cited in note 4). 
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derer in awe and preserve order in the world as well as property."J7 
To avoid domestic tyranny, wrote Trenchard and Moyle, the people 
must be armed to 
stand upon [their] own Defence; which if [they] are enabled to 
do, [they] shall never be put upon it, but [their] Swords may 
grow rusty in [their] hands; for that Nation is surest to live in 
Peace, that is most capable of making War; and a Man that hath 
a Sword by his side, shall have least occasion to make use of it.JB 
Whatever the merits of this deterrence theory, in other respects the 
Founders also carried their belief in the right to arms to absurdly 
utopian extremes. Writers like Timothy Dwight and Joel Barlow 
airily dismissed the dangers inherent in widespread possession of 
arms: 
[T]heir conscious dignity, as citizens enjoying equal rights, [pre-
cludes armed citizens having any desire] to invade the rights of 
others. The danger (where there is any) from armed citizens, is 
only to the government, not to the society; and as long as they 
have nothing to revenge in the government (which they cannot 
have while it is in their own hands) there are many advantages in 
their being accustomed to the use of arms, and no possible 
disadvantage. 39 
Even more outlandish to modem eyes is the explanation which the 
early English liberal Francis Place gave of how hatred and violence 
against the Jews were erased in eighteenth century England: 
Dogs could not be used in the streets in the manner many Jews 
were treated. One circumstance among others put an end to the 
ill-usage of the Jews .... About the year 1787 Daniel Mendoza, a 
Jew, became a celebrated boxer and set up a school to teach the 
art of boxing as a science, the art soon spread among the young 
Jews and they became generally expert at it. The consequence 
was in a very few years seen and felt too. It was no longer safe to 
insult a Jew unless he was an old man and alone .... But even if 
the Jews were unable to defend themselves, the few who would 
now be disposed to insult them merely because they are Jews, 
would be in danger of chastisement from the passers-by and of 
punishment from the police.40 
37. Conway, ed., I Writings at 56 (cited in note 16). 
38. Trenchard & Moyle, An Argument at 12 (cited in note 35). 
39. Barlow, Advice to the Privileged at 17 (cited in note 32). See also Timothy Dwight, 
I Travels in New England and New York xiv (Charles Wood, London ed. 1823). 
40. Francis Place, Improvement of the Working Classes (1834), as quoted in R.K. 
Webb, Modem England: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present 115 n.l4 (Dodd, Mead, 
1970) ("Modem England''). 
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The Founders' reasons for guaranteeing a right to arms for in-
dividual self-protection were not limited to abstract moral precepts 
or even a utopian belief in the potential efficacy of an armed popu-
lace against tyranny and mayhem. The second amendment reflects 
concrete historical circumstances which help explain why the right 
to arms in our Bill of Rights follows immediately upon the first 
amendment and precedes the third and fourth. 
Probably the most obvious political ramification of the right to 
defensive arms is the deterrent effect of the power to disarm dissent-
ers in a violence-ridden society. Until the early nineteenth century 
England was an enormously violent country overrun with cut-
throats, cutpurses, burglars, and highwaymen, and in which rioting 
over social and political matters was endemic. Moreover, until 
1829 it had no police. So when the seventeenth century Stuart 
Kings began selectively disarming their enemies the effect was not 
simply to safeguard the throne, but to severely penalize dissent. 
Those who had opposed the King were left helpless against either 
felons or rioters--who, by the very fact, were encouraged to attack 
them. The in terrorrem effect upon dissent of knowing that to speak 
out might render one's family defenseless while targeting them for 
every felon, and every enemy who might want to whip up riotous 
public sentiment against them, is obvious. 
Many readers in well-policed modem America may find it diffi-
cult to see riot either as a socio-political phenomenon or as some-
thing to which personal self-protection is relevant. Yet over many 
years riot and nightrider attacks-perpetrated while police stand 
by-have served to undercut or destroy civil rights gains, strike 
back at racial and ethnic minorities, and exclude blacks from white 
neighborhoods. It has been suggested that the availability of fire-
arms for protection against private, retaliatory violence was a key to 
the Civil Rights Movement's survival in the southern United States 
of the 1950s and 1960s. 41 Comparison might be made to South Af-
rica where blacks, though an overwhelming majority, are subject to 
one of the world's most effective gun control campaigns.42 
The disarming of minorities or dissenters in a climate in which 
they may be subject to private violence (often encouraged by gov-
ernment) has been a well-established policy in many countries in-
cluding Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The leading example 
41. John R. Salter and Don B. Kates, The Necessity of Access to Firearms by Dissenters 
Whom Government is Unwilling or Unable to Protect, in Don B. Kates, ed., Restricting Hand-
guns: The Liberal Skeptics Speak Out 185 (North River Press, 1979) ("Restricting Hand-
guns"); Cottrol & Diamond, 80 Geo. L.J. at 355 (cited in note 4). 
42. See Raymond G. Kessler, Gun Control and Political Power, 5 Law & Policy Q. 381, 
399-391 (1983). 
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is the Kristallnacht, in which thousands of Jews were beaten, raped 
and/or murdered and a billion reichsmarks of Jewish property was 
looted or destroyed in nationwide riots orchestrated by the Nazi 
Party after the Jews had been excluded from gun ownership under 
German law.43 It is unlikely that many German Jews wanted to 
own arms, or that it would have made any difference to their even-
tual fate. But it is an item of faith in Israel that one reason the Jews 
persevered and triumphed in the Middle East-where they were 
during the 1930s a far smaller minority than in Europe, and subject 
to similar violence-was because they took steps to obtain and use 
arms.44 
Rioters and vigilantes are not the only kinds of villains against 
whom the necessity of protection may be less clearly perceived to-
day than it was in the age of Blackstone. No less a menace than 
rioters or outlaws was the pillaging soldier, loosed not only on for-
eign populations but in his own country for political, religious, or 
social reasons or because of the King's inability to pay and thus to 
control him. Generally speaking, there was no difference in charac-
ter among rioters, felons and soldiers-who were often one and the 
same. Often the soldier was a common criminal inducted directly 
out of jail and unleashed on the King's enemies, whether foreign or 
domestic. The perpetration of such outrages upon his critics by 
Charles I engendered the Petition of Right of 1628 and helped even-
tually to bring him to the headsman. But of innumerable such ex-
amples that might be cited from European history in this period, 
probably the one most remembered by eighteenth century English-
men and Americans would have been the persecution that drove the 
Huguenots to their shores by the thousands. As a modern historian 
has noted, among the numerous tribulations visited in the 1690s 
upon the Huguenots in order to compel them to convert, 
the most atrocious-and effective-were the dragonnades, or bil-
leting of dragoons on Huguenot families with encouragement to 
behave as viciously as they wished. Notoriously rough and un-
disciplined, the enlisted troops of the dragoons spread carnage, 
beating and robbing the householders, raping the women, smash-
ing and wrecking and leaving filth ... 45 
43. Kates, Restricting Handguns at 185 (quoting official commentary on the German 
Firearms Act of 1937 which explicitly excluded gun permit applications by Jews) (cited in 
note 41). See id. at 188 (statement by Hermann Goering, then head of the German police: 
"Certainly I shall use the police-and most ruthlessly-whenever the German people are 
hurt; but I refuse the notion that the police are protective troops for Jewish stores. The police 
protect whoever comes into Germany legitimately, but not Jewish usurers.") 
44. Personal communication with Abraham N. Tennenbaum, Israeli attorney and po-
lice lieutenant. 
45. Barbara W. Tuchman, The March of Folly 21 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1984). 
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As Englishmen and Americans were well aware from their reading 
of Bodin, Beccaria and Montesquieu, the Huguenots had been ren-
dered incapable of resisting either individually or as a group by the 
Continental policy of disarming all but the Catholic nobility. 
The need to be armed for individual protection had been 
brought home to late eighteenth century Americans by their own 
experience with the "licentious and outrageous behavior of the mili-
tary" Britain sent among them during the decade of protest and 
turmoil that preceded the Revolution.46 As in England itself, the 
people's unwillingness to enforce smuggling laws required the state 
to use soldiers to perform the duties of the non-existent police. 
Committed to the folly of "asserting a right [to tax the colonists] 
you know you cannot exert,"47 during the 1760s and early 1770s 
England dispatched ever-increasing numbers of troops as the Stamp 
Tax was added to the Navigation Acts and then succeeded by the 
Townshend Acts, the Tea Tax, etc. These soldiers (eventually oper-
ating under a specially appointed British Customs Board) executed 
both ordinary warrants and the notorious Writs of Assistance under 
which they made wholesale searches of vessels, homes, vehicles, and 
warehouses, perusing goods, documents and records, all in a tumul-
tuous process in which even those things not seized were often de-
stroyed along with the surrounding furnishings. 48 
By 1768 the people of Massachusetts, the most radical and im-
patient of the colonies, had had enough. Rendered over-confident 
by military reinforcements, the Customs Board had seized John 
Hancock's ship Liberty and then fled to a British warship for safety 
in the resulting tumult. The Customs Board's intention to continue 
the searches was evident and General Gage was calling in troops for 
that purpose from all over the colonies and Canada. Seven years of 
protest had resulted in the colonies feeling the yoke of ever-in-
creased military occupation and Massachusetts' latest protest (a cir-
cular letter to the other colonial legislatures urging non-payment of 
the taxes) had been met by an official demand that the letter be 
repudiated on pain of dissolution of the Massachusetts Assembly. 
So leading figures in Boston, and the town officially, advised 
the citizens that their only resource was to arm themselves for the 
46. This description is taken from A Journal of the Times (March 17, 1769), a Boston 
publication expressing the Whig point of view that was reprinted throughout the colonies and 
in England, excerpted in Oliver Dickerson, ed., Boston Under Military Rule 19 (Chapman & 
Grimes, 1936). 
47. Lord Chesterfield, quoted in Tuchman, March of Folly at 158 (cited in note 45). 
48. For a detailed discussion of the events detailed in this and the following paragraphs, 
see Stephen P. Halbrook, Encroachments of the Crown on the Liberty of the Subject: Pre-
Revolutionary On'gins of the Second Amendment, 15 U. Dayton L. Rev. 91 (1989). 
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protection of their liberty and property. An article reprinted in 
newspapers throughout the colonies alleged abuses by the soldiers 
carrying out searches "of such nature" and "carried to such 
lengths" that for "the inhabitants to provide themselves with arms 
for their defence, was a measure as prudent as it was legal .... " As 
to the legality of personal armament, the article went on to invoke 
Blackstone himself in terms that emphasize both the political nature 
of the right and its relationship to the right of self-defense: 
It is a natural right which the people have reserved to them-
selves, confirmed by the [English] Bill of Rights, to keep arms for 
their own defence; and as Mr. Blackstone observes, it is to be 
made use of when the sanctions of society and law are found 
insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.49 
The denouement, of course, was an ever-escalating series of in-
cidents between the colonists and troops attempting to enforce the 
taxes and customs duties and to suppress protest of them. The Bos-
ton Massacre, General Gage's confiscation of the arms stored at 
Lexington and Concord, and his subsequent attempt to disarm the 
entire populace of Boston are among the most important of the inci-
dents that propelled the colonies into revolution. 
The desirability of citizens arming themselves against illegal 
search may seem doubtful to modem Americans enjoying the bene-
fits of a vigilant judiciary and police of a character far better than 
the soldiery known to our forefathers. But to eighteenth century 
Americans, the course of pre-Revolution British policy only con-
firmed the necessity of every free citizen having access to arms: "to 
disarm the people" said George Mason later, "was the best and ef-
fectual way to enslave them. "so This imagery of "enslavement" and 
the possession of arms as the guarantee against it appears through-
out the writings of Sidney, Locke and their disciples up to and in-
cluding the Founders, forming a consistent theme consisting of the 
following propositions: every free man has an inalienable right to 
defend himself against robbery and murder--or enslavement, which 
partakes of both; the difference between a slave and a free man is 
the latter's possession of arms which allows him to exercise his right 
of self-defense; for government to disarm the citizen is not just to 
rob him of his property and liberty, it is the first step toward "en-
slaving" him, by robbing him of all his property and all his liberties. 
In America from the immediate pre-Revolutionary period through 
49. From A Journal of the Times (March 17, 1769), excerpted in Dickerson, ed., Boston 
Under Military Rule at 79 (cited in note 46). 
50. Jonathan Elliott, 3 Debates in the Severo/ State Conventions 380 (J.B. Lippincott, 2d 
ed. 1836). 
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the debates over the Constitution, this equation of personal self-pro-
tection with resistance to tyranny~f self-protection against the 
slave trader to self-protection against "enslavement" by govern-
ment-recurs again and again.s1 
In evaluating how such statements relate to the concept of self-
protection it is also essential to remember that the imagery of a man 
defending himself against abduction by a slaver was not the mere 
figure of speech it might seem to us. Locke, Sidney and their con-
temporaries lived in a world in which human slavery was a gro-
tesque reality; the Founders lived among, and upon the labor of, a 
people many of whom were being held under duress. At least some 
of the Founders were acutely conscious of the inconsistency be-
tween their noble declamations about their own freedom and their 
actual conduct regarding the enslavement of others. In invoking 
the right to resist "enslavement" they were analogizing to a situa-
tion conceived quite literally in terms of a right and need for direct 
personal self-defense. 
This background suggests why Blackstone saw political over-
tones in the right to arms, coupling his discussion of it to rights that 
are plainly political in nature. It helps explain why in the Bill of 
Rights arms follows religion, expression, press and petition-and is 
followed by the third amendment guarantee against quartering of 
soldiers and the fourth against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
In view of this background, two other connections between the 
fourth, third, and second amendments merit mention: First, in both 
French and English experience, searches and seizures would gener-
ally have been carried out by soldiery rather than by civil authori-
ties; second, the castle doctrine which the fourth amendment 
enunciates ("a man's home is his castle and his defense") originated 
in caselaw exonerating freeholders who had killed intruders.s2 In 
short, not only are these rights phrased in substantially identical 
terms (the first, second, and fourth amendments all speak in terms 
of rights "of the people"), but their roots, and the situations in 
which they were visualized as operating, are closely identified. 
The self-defense origins of the second amendment are thus 
many and complex. Natural law philosophers saw self-defense as 
the primary natural right. From it they adduced a variety of other 
rights (for both individuals and collectivities), the most obvious and 
closely related being the right to arms. These connections were par-
ticularly important to Lockeans and their progeny down to and in-
51. See Maier, From Resistance to Revolution (cited in note 9). 
52. See Kates, 82 Mich. L. Rev. at 205 (cited in note 1), and cases cited therein at note 
5. 
1992] SECOND AMENDMENT 103 
eluding the Founders. They saw killings, maimings, assaults, 
despoilation and raping as equally criminal whether the perpetra-
tors were apolitical outlaws or "lewd Villains" serving a "wicked 
Magistrate." Viewing despotic impositions and terrorization of the 
people as a species of criminal usurpation, the Founders saw the 
rights of individual arms possession and resistance, and of collective 
revolution where necessary, as aspects of the right to self-defense. 
At the same time the Lockeans believed widespread popular posses-
sion of arms to be a powerful deterrent to political and apolitical 
crime alike. 
No less important in shaping the amendment was the Anglo-
American legal tradition (as the Founders understood it) which was 
influential both in its own right and as support for the view of the 
right to arms which the Founders took from classical political phi-
losophy. In that tradition there were no police and the very idea of 
empowering government to place an armed force in constant watch 
over the populace was vehemently rejected as a paradigm of abhor-
rent French despotism.sJ Notwithstanding the evident need for 
municipal police, it would be another forty-fifty years before police 
were commissioned in either English or American cities. Even then 
they were specifically forbidden arms, under the view that if these 
were needed they could call armed citizens to their aid. (Ironically, 
the only gun control in nineteenth century England was the policy 
forbidding police to have arms while on duty.)s4 
In the absence of a police, the American legal tradition was for 
responsible, law abiding citizens to be armed and to see to their own 
defense, and for most military age males to chase down criminals in 
response to the hue and cry and to perform the more formal police 
duties associated with their membership in the posse comitatus and 
the militia. It was the possession of arms in these contexts which 
the second amendment constitutionalized. "The right" to arms re-
fers to that which pre-existed in American common and statutory 
law, i.e., the legal right to possess arms which was enjoyed by all 
responsible, law-abiding individuals, including both militiamen and 
those exempt from militia service (the clergy, women, conscientious 
objectors and men over the age of militia service). 
53. See Tuchman, March of Folly at 148 (cited in note 44); see also Webb, Modem 
England at 184 (cited in note 40). 
54. The British tradition of unarmed policing persists to this day because crime, partic-
ularly violent crime, fell rapidly throughout nineteenth century England; in contrast, as 
American violence increased police seized the right to be armed by refusing to patrol un-
armed. Colin Greenwood, Firearms Control: A Study of Armed Crime and Firearms Control 
in England and Wales, ch. I (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971); Mom, Firearms Use, in Kates, 
Firearms and Violence at 496-500 (cited in note 21). 
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Nor should it be thought that the Founders would necessarily 
have repudiated their belief in the right of self-defense-and of indi-
viduals to be armed for self-defense-if they had anticipated the re-
placement of the militia and posse comitatus by modem police 
agencies. They knew of the Stuarts' attempts to penalize dissent by 
disarming their opponents in an era of rampant crime and violence. 
Nor would it have seemed prudent to rely on the state as protector 
(rather than exploiter) of its unarmed citizens, given the examples 
of the Customs Board, and of General Gage's troops and the sol-
diery generally, in eighteenth century America or Stuart England 
and Bourbon France. Rather those examples confirmed both the 
criminologically based worldview of classical philosophy and its 
foundation in the even more ancient dictum that just and popular 
governments rest upon widespread popular possession of arms. Ba-
sic to tyrants is the "habit of distrusting the masses, and the policy, 
consequent upon it, of depriving them of arms. "ss 
55. Ernest Barker, ed. & tr., The Politics of Aristotle 237 (Oxford U. Press, 1972). 
